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NOTES
Racial Intermarriage-A Constitutional Problem
INTRODUCTION
... [I] t was dictated by wise statesmanship, and has a broad and solid
foundation in enlightened policy, sustained by sound reason and common
sense....j
Such was the attitude of the Georgia Supreme Court, sitting in
Atlanta in 1869, toward the state's anti-miscegenation law. The
tradition of similar legislation prohibiting or discouraging mar-
riage between whites and negroes is nearly 300 years old in America.
The General Assembly of Maryland passed the first statute in 1664
which declared that the issue of a marriage between an English
woman and a negro slave were slaves, and the white woman was
bound to serve her husband's master during coverture.2 The prin-
ciple spread to Massachusetts in 1705, North Carolina in 1715, and
Pennsylvania in 1725.' A total of thirty-eight states have, in the
past, enacted prohibitions, and twenty-four states still have them.4
Six of the southern states have seen fit to embody the principle in
their constitutions.5 Today, Illinois, Ohio, Michigan, and New York
are the only states with large negro populations that do not have
anti-miscegenation laws. All of the statutes prohibit negro-white
marriages, but some have been extended to include Malayans,' Mon-
1. Scott v. State, 39 Ga. 321, 323 (1869).
2. 10 ENcyc. Soc. ScI 532 (1933).
3. REUTER, RACE xTuRE 81 (1931).
4. ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 102; ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 360 (1940); Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 25-101 (1956); ARK. STAT. § 55-104 (1947); DEl.. CODE AtNx. tit. 13, § 101 (1953);
FLA. CONST. art. 16, § 24; FLA. STAT. § 741.11 (1955); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-106 (1935);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-206 (1948); IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-104 (1952); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 402.020 (1955); LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 94 (West 1952); MD. ANN. CODE art.
27, § 398 (1957); Miss. CONST. art. 14, § 263; Miss. CODE ANN. § 459 (1942); Mo. R.V.
STAT. § 451.020 (1949); NEB. REV. STAT. S 42-103 (1943); NEa. Ray. STAT. § 122.180
(1957); N.C. CoNsT. art. XIV, § 8; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-3 (1950), as amended (1953);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 12 (1951); S.C. CONsT. art. 3, 5 33; S.C. CODE § 20-7 (.1952); TENN.
CONsT. art. 11, § 14; TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-402 (1956); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 4607
(1925); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2 (1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-54 (1950); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 4701 (1) (1955); WYO. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 50-108 (1945). The validity
of the Nevada statute is doubtful. See Time, Dec. 22, 1958, p. 17.
5. Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee.
6. Arizona, Maryland, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming.
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golians, 7 American Indians,' Chinese, 9 Japanese, 10 Hindus," mesti-
zos,-" half-breeds,"1 and the brown race.' 4
These various prohibitions create three distinct problems. First
is the question of the constitutionality of the measures. Second is
the choice of law problem, for some states which prohibit misce-
genetic marriages will not recognize them even if they are legal
where solemnized. Third is the problem of defining who is a mem-
ber of what race. It should be noted that a person can be a negro
by one state's definition and not by another's. This is a result of
either no definition, or different definitions in the various statutes.",
The scope of this note is limited to the constitutional problem
created by the negro-white relations of today.
THE PROBLEM
The general American policy has always been to absorb different
groups, but this did not extend to the negro race. From the very
beginning of our country a basic anti-amalgamation doctrine has
been followed. As a result, numerous problems have arisen. Most
of the problem areas, such as education, employment, and landhold-
ing affect the entire population. This is not true of the intermar-
riage problem. It cannot compare with those listed in regard to the
number of persons affected. Although so few are affected, it is in-
teresting to note how whites and negroes evaluate their respective
positions. Myrdal, in his classic work on the negro problem, lists
the following as the "Rank Order of Discriminations" of southern
whites. He stated that northerners had the same order only it was
more vague.
1) Intermarriage and sexual intercourse with white women.
2) Dancing, bathing, eating, drinking together, and social inter-
course in general.
3) Discrimination in schools, churches, and transportation.
4) Political disenfranchisement.
5) Discrimination by police and law enforcement agencies in
general.
6) Discrimination in housing, employment, credit, and public
relief.16
7. Arizona, Idaho, Missouri, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming.
8. North Carolina and South Carolina.
9. Nebraska.
10. Nebraska.
11. Arizona.
12. South Carolina.
13. South Carolina.
14. Nevada.
15. For an interesting discussion of this problem see Note, 11 FLA. L. REV. 235 (1958).
16. 1 MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN D~moc-
Racy 60 (1944).
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Myrdal noted that the negroes' rank order of objectionable atti-
tudes is just the reverse of the whites'.
Why then is the validity of these statutes important? The negro
minority does not seem interested in the subject, and it affects so few
persons. It is true that the intermarriage issue will never directly
touch most negroes or whites, but the psychological impact on the
great majority of Americans is evidenced by the rankings above. A
prominent negro writer, Rayford W. Logan, said: "On no aspect of
the race problem are most white Americans, North as well as South,
so adamant as they are on their opposition to intermarriage."' 17
THE JUDICIAL APPROACH
When the validity of an anti-miscegenation statute is questioned,
it is usually alleged that it violates the fourteenth amendment, either
the due process clause or the equal protection clause, or both. Less
frequently it is argued that the statute violates religious freedom as
guaranteed by the first amendment. While the volume of litigation
in the last 100 years has been slight, the opinions represent many
different approaches as to the meaning and place of the Constitution
in our federal system of government. The highest courts of only
fourteen states have decided the issue.' The Supreme Court of the
United States has never decided it, although it has had the oppor-
tunity to do so. Of the so-called fourteen leading cases, only one
has held an anti-miscegenation statute unconstitutional. 9 For many
years there appeared to be no doubt about the issue, but the Cali-
fornia court in the Perez case broke the chain. The declarations of
the courts which have upheld the statutes fall generally into three
categories:
1) There is no violation of the fourteenth amendment because
regulation of marriage is a matter of state concern. The states dear-
ly had the power to regulate marriage before the Constitution was
adopted, and nowhere in the Constitution did the states give the fed-
eral government this regulatory power. Since this is the case, under
the tenth amendment the power is reserved to the states.2 0  These
17. R. LOGAN, WHAT THE3 NEGRO WANTs 28 (1944).
18. Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190 (1877); State v. Pass, 59 Ariz. 16, 121 P.2d 882 (1942);
Dodson v. State, 61 Ark. 57, 31 S.W. 977 (1895); Jackson v. City and County of Denver,
109 Colo. 196, 124 P.2d 240 (1942); Scott v. State, 39 Ga. 321 (1869); State v. Gibson,
36 Ind. 389 (1871); State v. Brown, 236 Ia. 562, 108 So. 2d 233 (1959); Miller v. Lucks,
203 Miss. 824, 36 So. 2d 140 (1948); State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 174 (1883); State v. Kennedy,
76 N.C. 251 (1877); Eggers v. Olson, 104 Okla. 297, 231 Pac. 483 (1924); Lonas v. State,
50 Tenn. 287 (1871); Naim v. Naim 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749 (1955), remanded, 350
U.S. 891 (1955), aft'd, 197 Va. 734, 90 S.E.2d 849 (1956), appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 985
(1956); Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal.2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948).
19. Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal.2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948). Burns v. State, 48 Ala. 195
(1872) held the Alabama law unconstitutional but it was overruled 5 years later by Green v.
State, 58 Ala. 190 (1877).
20. Lonas v. State, 50 Tenn. 287 (1871); State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389 (1871); State v.
Jackson, 80 Mo. 175 (1883).
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courts talk in terms of the police power and the fourteenth amend-
ment being mutually exclusive. Also, the states may have such an
interest in the contract of marriage that permits them to so legis-
late.21 A more recent case held that the Oklahoma law did not vio-
late the Constitution because marriage is a consentient covenant so
closely related to morals and civilization that its control is a matter
of state concern.22
2) There is no question of race discrimination because the stat-
ute applies to both white and negro.3
3) The preservation of racial purity is a legitimate objective
because amalgamation is against "natural law," for the races are not
meant to mix, 24 or the purpose of the statute is to prevent "deplor-
able results" and the dragging down of the "superior" race.2 5
The most recent case of note is Naim v. Naim decided by the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia in 1955.26 The plaintiff, a
white person, brought suit to annul her marriage to a Chinese. They
left Virginia to be married in North Carolina and immediately re-
turned to Virginia where they lived as husband and wife. It was
conceded that they left Virginia to evade the law which forbade their
marriage. The high court of Virginia held that the statute did not
violate the fourteenth amendment, and thus, the marriage was void.
The United States Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction, but re-
manded the case to the trial court for the taking of additional testi-
mony concerning the domicile of the parties. The Supreme Court
of Appeals of Virginia thereupon refused to send it back to the trial
court on the grounds that neither the rules of the court nor statutes
of the Commonwealth provided for such a procedure. Then, in an
unusual move, the court affirmed its own decision. 8 Upon appel-
lant's second application to the Supreme Court for either oral argu-
ment on the merits, or withdrawal of the order to remand, the Court
held that the case was devoid of a federal question and refused to
hear it.29
The Virginia court used all available arguments to uphold the
statute. Starting with the proposition stated by the Supreme Court
in Maynard v. Hill13 that marriage is subject to the state's control,
21. Eggers v. Olson, 104 Okla. 297, 231 Pac. 483 (1924).
22. Stevens v. United States, 146 F.2d 120 (10th Cir. 1944).
23. Jackson v. City and County of Denver, 109 Colo. 196, 124 P.2d 240 (1942); Stevens v.
United States, 146 F.2d 120 (10th Cir. 1944); State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175 (1883).
24. Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190 (1877); State v. Pass, 59 Ariz. 16, 121 P.2d 882 (1942).
25. Scott v. State, 39 Ga. 321 (1869).
26. 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749 (1955), remanded, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), affd, 197 Va.
734, 90 S.E.2d 849 (1956), appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
27. 350 U.S. 891 (1955).
28. 197 Va. 734, 90 S.E.2d 849 (1956).
29. 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
30. 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
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the court declared that the unquestioned policy of the state was to
preserve racial integrity. To do this was not unconstitutional for
two reasons. First, the court used the traditional argument that the
tenth amendment reserved this power to the state; therefore, since
the purpose of the statute was in the interest of public morals and
welfare, it was valid. The second line of reasoning presented a dis-
tinction between social rights on the one hand and property and civil
rights on the other. To point up this distinction, the court noted the
difference between the right involved in the case before it and those
in Buchanan v. Warley 1 and Shelley v. Kraemer.2  The Supreme
Court, in the Buchanan case, declared that the thirteenth and four-
teenth amendments did not deal with the social rights of men, but
rather with their property rights. Similarly, in the Shelley case, the
Court held that the primary purpose of the fourteenth amendment
was to protect basic civil and political rights. The Virginia court
also pointed out that the underlying idea of Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation33 was the fact that "the very foundation of good citizenship"
was education, and that no such claim for racial intermarriage could
be made. Therefore, since the preservation of racial integrity was
permissible, classification by race was not arbitrary for it was the
only way to accomplish the legislative purpose.
The majority opinions of the Perez34 case present a clouded ap-
proach to the problem. The supreme court was sitting as a court of
first instance to hear a mandamus action brought by a white woman
and a negro man to compel defendant to issue a marriage license.
The court concluded that the anti-miscegenation statute violated the
Constitution; therefore, the writ was issued. The base point of the
"majority" opinion, on which only two justices could agree, was that
the right to marry is protected by the Constitution, 5 and this right
is the right to marry "the person of one's choice." The issue was
then the propriety of the state's attempt to restrict this choice on the
basis of race. By two somewhat different approaches, the court held
that racial classification did not meet the test of the fourteenth
amendment. Initially, the opinion analogized the question to the
one before the United States Supreme Court in the Hirabayashi
case. 6  From the discussion in this case, the California court con-
31. 245 U.S. 60 (1917). The Supreme Court declared unconstitutional an ordinance mak-
ing it unlawful for colored persons to move into and occupy any house where a greater number
of houses in that particular block were occupied by white persons.
32. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). The Supreme Court held that it was a violation of the 14th amend-
ment for a state court to enforce a restrictive covenant
33. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Court held that schools segregated on the basis of race did
not meet the standards required by the 14th amendment.
34. Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal.2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948).
35. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
36. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). The Court held that it was within
the constitutional authority of Congress and the Executive, acting together, to prescribe a cur-
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cluded that since the classification was based on race, the statute in
question must be designed to meet a clear and present danger. Ap-
parently, the court could find none for it decided that any prohibition
based on susceptibility to disease would have to apply to individuals,
not races.
Assuming that such a classification can be made in the absence
of an emergency, the question then became, did it have a substantial
relation to a legitimate legislative objective? Again, the answer was
no. The court could find no merit or support for the argument that
the negro race is physically and mentally inferior. The second basic
contention of appellee on this point was that the progeny of a mixed
marriage create serious community problems. The answer to this
was that you cannot endeavor to keep the public peace by denying
constitutional rights.3 7 The concurring opinions presented two wide-
ly divergent approaches. Judge Carter took the position that the
statutes never were constitutional. When enacted they violated the
"fundamental law" embodied in the Declaration of Independence and
the Constitution; and if this is not enough, they were clearly invali-
dated by the fourteenth amendment. He said they are opposed to
the very principles which we have fought three wars to preserve. Al-
though it would not seem necessary to his basic argument, he pointed
out that California does recognize miscegenetic marriages if they are
entered into where no prohibition existed. Judge Edmonds defined
his position more clearly. Since marriage is a "fundamental right
of free men" and grounded "in the fundamental principles" of Chris-
tianity, it is protected by the first amendment as applied to state
action via the fourteenth under the doctrine of Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut.38 This being the case, reasonable classification is not the test;
there must be a "clear and present danger." He pointed out that
respondent did not contend that there was a clear and present danger,
nor could the court find one, so the statutes were invalid.
Such variance in the reasoning of an important opinion holding a
law unconstitutional certainly weakens its effect on future litigation
in other jurisdictions.
OBSERVATIONS
Anti-amalgamation statutes may be susfined under the four-
teenth amendment. It is not necessary that state power be con-
sidered unbridled by the United States Constitution. States' rights,
however, must be respected. Assume that the right to marry is pro-
few order as an emergency war measure. The order provided that all persons of Japanese
ancestry must remain within their residences during certain hours.
37. As a third ground the court held that the code sections were too vague and uncertain to
constitute a valid regulation. The dissenting opinion pointed out that this was not an issue,
for the petitioners had plainly identified themselves as negro and white.
38. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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tected by the fourteenth amendment as said by the Supreme Court
in Meyer v. Nebraska.9  If the right is so protected, just what limi-
tation does this place upon state power? A state may regulate mar-
riage on the basis of consanguinity or disease; however, this is on an
individual basis. It must also be noted that in the United States, a
person is restricted to one spouse, and many persons feel that racial
intermarriage is more offensive than bigamy. The Court had little
difficulty in upholding laws enforcing monogamy.40 Polygamy is a
good example of a social right closely akin to racial intermarriage.
With civil or property rights, constitutional considerations may nul-
lify the people's wishes, as they did in Little Rock; with social rights,
however, the desire of the majority may overcome vague or tenuous
constitutional precepts. The decisions enforcing monogamy concede
to the states a tremendous power, for the express purpose of the laws
was to suppress a practice among a small, but sincere, minority group.
Certainly their freedom of choice was restricted to conform to the
wishes of the majority. Note, that there was no question of race
involved.
Furthermore, it is not necessary that one state's policy be accept-
able to all others. The laws of our states are not uniform, nor need
they be for "the customs, habits, and thoughts of the people in one
state differ widely from those of the people in another .... "41 Since
regulation of marriage is primarily a state function, the courts should
give the greatest possible effect to the policy of any state, whether it
conflicts with ideas of others or not. At the time the Constitution
was adopted, anti-miscegenation statutes were widespread. Similarly,
at the time of the war between the states, many northern states had
these laws. At mid-nineteenth century, racial intermarriage was not
considered as a right in many states, so is it reasonable to say that the
fourteenth amendment was intended to invalidate all statutes pro-
hibiting amalgamation? Today, the attitude of the states is dear.
Some twenty-four, speaking through their legislatures, have taken a
stand against miscegenation, and in general, the practice is not con-
doned by the great number of persons throughout the country.
Spencer Logan, in his book, A Negro's Faith in America, said:
Speaking as a Negro, I know that most Negroes do not desire sexual
relationships with white women.... He asks only that you do -not in-
trude upon his hearthstone if you want the members of his race to honor
yours.42
The test of an anti-miscegenation statute is said to be "reason-
ableness." What is this? Basically, if the purpose of a statute is
to burden the members of a race, it is not reasonable. Unquestion-
39. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
40. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Dais v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
41. State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389 (1871).
42. S. LoGAw, A NEGRO'S FArI IN AMMECA 27 (1946).
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ably, these anti-amalgamation statutes are not designed to burden one
race. They are to aid states in controlling real problems affecting
equally all races. A negro-white couple is not accepted into either
society, and the offspring of such union is even more of a problem.
This attitude is held by both negroes and whites throughout the na-
tion. Reuter, in his work on intermarriage and miscegenation, con-
cluded:
The hybrids produced in such bi-racial situations are marked men. Their
distinctive physical appearance gives a point about which sentiment may
crystallize; they cannot escape classification and categorical treatment.
In the circumstances they form or tend to form a caste or special class
in the population.43
Spencer Logan adds:
This feeling of superiority on the part of Negroes of mixed blood has
been the cause of much friction and unhappiness within the Negro
race.
4 4
Racial problems in most states today are tremendous; is it necessary
to provide the breeding ground for new ones?
CONCLUSION
Can we say that classification by race is reasonable? It is sub-
mitted that merely because it is based on race should not and does not
mean that it is unreasonable. Those who say otherwise analogize
marriage to education, landholding, working, and transportation.
This cannot be accurately done. All that can be said is that mar-
riage is sui generis. It is fundamental and basic - the bedrock of
our society. In the words of the Supreme Court:
Upon it society must be said to be built, and out of its fruits spring
social relations and social obligations and duties, with which government
is necessarily required to deal .... 45
Because marriage universally occupies a unique position and is
basically a state problem, it is submitted that when a legislature, in
attempting to resolve a state's social problems, determines that racial
mixture is undesirable, such classification as is necessary to effectuate
this policy is not unreasonable. The majority opinion in the Perez
case was careful to point out that the California law, while prohibit-
ing whites from marrying negroes, did not prohibit intermarriage
among other races. A more comprehensive statute could nullify this
objection.
Finally, consider just what is at stake in this controversy. The
number of negroes and whites directly affected by such prohibitions
43. REuTER, RAcE MixTuRE 30 (1931).
44. S. LoGAN, A NEGRO'S FAImH iN AMmucA 30 (1946).
45. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878).
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